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1 Introduction*
'[The inter-war experience suggests that
without controls on capital movements[ loose
funds may sweep round the world disorganiz-
ing all steady business.' John Maynard Keynes
'We have this false theory that markets, left to
their own devices, tend towards equilibrium.
To argue that financial markets in general, and
international lending in particular, need to be
regulated is likely to outrage the financial com-
munity: yet the evidence for just that is
overwhelming' George Soros
The globalisation of capital markets is now an
undisputed fact, but opinions differ widely as to
the origins of the evident volatility of exchange
rates and capital flows, and the proper means of
stabilising them. Even though there is broad agree-
ment that integration to international capital mar-
kets has considerable potential for increasing
investment, growth and employment, there is a
growing concern that the impact of this volatility
on developing countries - particularly but not
exclusively 'emerging market' economies - is dele-
terious. The present asset deflation and currency
collapse in East Asia have brought this topic into
the headlines, raising public action issues which
not only are important in themselves but also
throw light on the broader question of the social
benefits of economic globalisation, when there is
such great asymmetry between large firms and
states on the one hand, and small nations and the
poor on the other; and by extension the type of
institutions which would be required in a truly
global economy
The extension of a global capital market and the
rapid integration of developing countries into this
market are a fact of life (World Bank 1997); but so
are the consequences of marginalisation of those
groups or nations not able to compete efficiently
due to lack of resources, skills or institutions
(UNRISD 1995). Moreover, there are good reasons
to believe that financial markets are inherently
unstable, and have historically required strong
-
I would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for
support to the research programme at the Finance and
Trade Policy Research Centre from which this article is
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institutions to control them (Kindelberger 1996).
This argument is intrinsically stronger at the
international level than at the national one, but
international institutions for prudential financial
regulation and emergency intervention are weak or
even non-existent compared with those existing at
the national level. Further, such regulatory mecha-
nisms are strongest precisely in the most advanced
market economies (IMF 1998b). Even leading rep-
resentatives of the 'market' themselves feel that
there is something wrong.'
In this article I intend to step back from the
immediate issues of international crisis manage-
ment in East Asia in order to look at some current
policy debates on the construction of the interna-
tional institutional 'architecture' intended to cope
with global capital market volatility, from the point
of view of developing countries - and by extension
the three-quarters of humanity that inhabit them, It
is not my intention, therefore, to discuss policies by
which individual developing countries can mitigate
the effects of short-term capital 'surges' The struc-
ture of the article is thus as follows. Section 2
addresses the global causes of emerging market
volatility, its local consequences, and the failure of
international financial institutions (IFIs), such as
the IMF, to contain it. The current attempt to extend
multilateral bank regulation towards emerging mar-
kets is then discussed in section 3, and its limita-
tions identified, as are those of transborder mutual
recognition agreements and the proposed interna-
tional credit insurance scheme in section 4. The
prospects for establishing a binding set of rules for
international investment, with logical consequences
for both global capital taxation and international
debt write-offs, are examined as the basis for a long-
term solution in section 5, which also includes a
brief discussion of the institutions that are required
to create an orderly market in international capital
flows. Section 6 concludes, and derives the implica-
tion of the argument for the concept of 'global
citizenship'.
'Unless we review our concept of markets, they will
collapse, because we are creating global financial
markets vithout understanding their true nature' (Soros
1997).
For the results of a recent WIDER research project on
this issue, see Griffith-Jones et al. (forthcoming).
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2 Coping with Volatility in
International Capital Markets
Systemic characteristics of flows towards
emerging markets
Global capital markets are characterised by
asymmetric and incomplete information. The
increasing international exposure of both equity
funds in industrial countries and financial systems
in emerging market economies, has not been
accompanied by a corresponding depth of informa-
tion about the true value of the assets and liabilities.
The speed and scale of shock transmission between
markets has increased enormously due to techno-
logical advances in trading and settlement, which
forces traders to act without knowledge of wider
price movements, exacerbating fluctuations. There
are also substantial agency problems for bank
lenders and portfolio investors. Unlike multina-
tional corporations involved in direct foreign
investment, they can exercise little direct control
over the asset acquired and thus cannot protect its
market value. To the extent that banks and funds
cannot count upon their own governments or the
IFIs to ensure payment of their loans or maintenance
of asset value, the logical response is to avoid assets
which cannot be rapidly sold if things go wrong.
These information and agency problems lead
logically to the two main characteristics of short-
term investment in emerging markets. First,
international portfolio investors and bank lenders
seek liquidity and use 'quick exit' as a means of con-
taining downside risk. In consequence, indicators
such as the 'quick ratio' of a country's short-term
foreign liabilities to central bank reserves become
critical to market stability, and can easily trigger
self-fulfilling runs on a currency Second, fund man-
agers control risk not by seeking more information
or control, but by portfolio diversification based on
an assumed lack of covariance between emerging
market indices. The competition between funds for
clients' drives them towards seeking high-yield,
high-risk markets, but by the same token leads
Because depositors in (say) pension funds cannot
know the eventual value of the asset acquired when
they retire, they can only rely on the current return on
the fund in question. This encourages short-terrnism by
fund managers in order to gain market share - a bias
which is exacerbated by the system of quarterly bonuses
as a form of remuneration.
them to make frequent marginal adjustments to
their portfolios - adjustments which are marginal
to the aggregate portfolio of savers in developed
countries but non-marginal and highly destabilising
for the investors of developing countries.
The effect of these behavioural characteristics -
which are sometimes confusingly characterised as
'speculation' .- is exacerbated by the way in which
financial markets clear at the aggregate level. lt is
now well established in theory and practice that
financial markets are inherently 'credit-rationed' in
the sense that demand for funds always exceeds
supply at the equilibrium rate. There are good rea-
sons why the profit-maximising market equilibrium
should take this form, arising from information and
agency problems. In consequence, asset prices and
interest prices do not fully reflect risk, but lenders
use portfolio allocation rules - and thus rationing -
to reduce that risk. In the case of domestic banking,
this is reflected in loan limits to any one borrower
based on collateral rather than the return on the
project, and small differentials in lending rates;
while bank regulators prevent excessive portfolio
bias towards individual borrowers independently of
the rate of return. Offers of high interest rates by
dubious borrowers will lead to less rather than
more funds being supplied.
In consequence, shifts in portfolio composition (i.e.
rationing rules) correspond to changes in percep-
tions of country solvency by international investors
rather than to variations in underlying asset value.
Because of the asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders - emerging market assets form a relatively
small part of savers' portfolios in developed coun-
tries, but a large part of firms' and banks' liabilities
in developing countries - marginal shifts in lenders'
positions tend to destabilise borrowers' liquidity4
These surges are worsened by herding behaviour
due to mean variance portfolio optimisation as the
market grows. This can be explained by the fact
that, as opportunities for diversification increase,
the impact of news on the allocation of funds in a
single country, relative to initial allocations, grows
without bounds resulting in a massive outflow fur-
ther threatening financial stability Even if
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information on the return (or risk) on a particular
asset can be acquired at a cost, the benefit from this
knowledge eventually declines as the opportunities
for diversification increase, causing massive infor-
mation problems as investors have no incentive to
search for information since they are shielded by
diversification opportunities and liquidity
Therefore prudential regulation may be needed of
global lenders rather than of global borrowers.
The volatility of short-term capital flows (or 'capital
surges') is now recognised as a major problem for
macroeconomic management in developing coun-
tries; even though the precise consequences for the
'real' economy - that is, the behaviour of govern-
ment, firms and households which subsequently
translates into investment, growth, employment
and welfare - are not yet fully understood. Short-
term capital flow instability arises from the desire of
investors to hold liquid assets in the face of uncer-
tainty, affecting the real economy both through vari-
ations in prices, such as the interest rate and the
exchange rate, and quantities such as levels of bank
credit and government bond sales. In FitzGerald
(forthcoming), government expenditure is shown
to respond in an asymmetric manner to sudden
changes in investor perceptions of fiscal solvency
associated with portfolio capital surges. The impact
of short flows on output and investment by firms
through the availability of bank credit is also found
to be large and asymmetric. The macroeconomic
effect of capital surges on employment levels and
the real wage rate is shown to arise from their influ-
ence on real exchange rates and domestic demand
levels, although whether employment or wages
adjust depends on the monetary stabilisation policy
adopted. The implications of the analysis for longer-
term growth and policy design are considerable, but
not our direct concern here except insofar as
international regulatory arrangements should not
prevent appropriate national policies.
The effectiveness of international financial
institutions
The existing international institutional 'architecture'
to cope with these problems in emerging markets is
based on the Bretton Woods bodies, and the IMF in
In addition, financial liberalisation means that in an on the central bank because bank deposits can be
economy such as Mexico, the entire domestic money converted into dollars on demand.
supply isin effecta contingent foreign exchange claim
particular. As intergovernmental institutions, the
lETs are essentially lenders of last resort to develop-
ing country governments, against which facility
they can impose conditionality in return for the
restoration of liquidity. The common requirements
are for both specific monetary and fiscal policies in
order to stabilise the economy, and structural
reforms (financial reform, trade liberalisation, pri-
vatisation etc.) in order to restore long-term sol-
vency Whatever the effectiveness of this approach
in the middle-income sovereign debt crises of the
1980s, or to the chronic economic problems of
poor economies with weak states in Africa, it is not
appropriate for the emerging market crises of the
1990s. The Mexican and East Asian crises are essen-
tially related to private sector asset deflation and liq-
uidity shortages. Large international liabilities have
been built up by the private sector in emerging mar-
kets to finance infrastructure and real estate. The
currency risk was perceived as low by private
lenders due to the strong growth record and nomi-
nal exchange rate stability underpinned by the same
capital inflows. Private borrowers were encouraged
to seek foreign finance by financial liberalisation: on
the one hand, the lifting of restrictions on corporate
borrowing abroad as a means of balance of pay-
ments control, and on the other hand, higher inter-
est rates made domestic borrowing increasingly
unattractive.
Therefore, the root causes of the breakdown were
not prevented (and possibly have been exacerbated)
by Bretton Woods policies of accelerated financial
liberalisation, exchange rate anchoring and encour-
agement of private portfolio investment as a substi-
tute for sovereign borrowing. The problem has been
worsened by decreasing clarity and agreement as to
what 'fundamentals' actually are. Once gross fiscal
and monetary imbalances have been overcome,
inflation is under control, growth is reasonably
rapid, and market liberalisation is underway; all
the main indicators become positive signals for
investors. Large current account deficits are seen as
a sign of success in attracting foreign investment,
It is sometimes suggested that as such agencies have
emerging market governments as clients for the rating of
new issues, they are reluctant to downgrade them - but
there is no reliable evidence of this.
The assessment of whether the current account deficit
of a particular country reflects longer-term debt
solvency, and thus the evaluation of the exchange rate
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while corporate foreign debt is seen to express
financial diversification. The IFIs appear to have
taken the position that, as long as the external
deficit reflects a private investment-savings gap
rather than a fiscal deficit, it must reflect rational
decisions about consumption-smoothing over time
and is thus sustainable. What is more, even if the
IFIs had wished to prevent such inflows, their only
instrument for controlling borrowers is last-resort
lending to borrowing countries, while their influ-
ence over lenders is limited to issuing negative
macroeconomic evaluation with the consequent
danger of market collapse.
Global surveillance is not only carried out by the
IFIs. The failure of the leading private ratings agen-
cies to predict collapse in Mexico and East Asia is
notorious. There are various reasons for this,
including the methodology used to construct rat-
ings (which is largely backward- rather than for-
ward-looking) and the natural desire not to
destabilise markets.5 In principle, if the issue were
one of information as such, the ratings agency
should be able to invest in better information on
country risk than any one investor and then provide
what is effectively a public good for a modest fee.
However, in practice the problem appears to be dif-
ferent: on the one hand, the way in which informa-
tion is used by ratings agencies seems to be
deficient - an issue of economic interpretation
rather than economic statistics; on the other hand,
portfolio investors and banks engaged in securitis-
Ing loans to their clients rely on portfolio diversifi-
cation, rather than careful risk assessment, to
prevent losses.
In sum, the emerging market financial collapse
problem has three key characteristics. First, it is
largely a 'private sector' problem of excessive lend-
ing by private banks and non-bank financial inter-
mediaries in developed countries to private banks
and corporations in developing countries. It is not
an issue of sovereign borrowing as such, as was the
case in the 1980s, and thus is not really suitable for
risk and the probability of a policy shift which could
affect asset values, depends not only on knowing what
the current payments and debt Situation 5, but also the
expected rate of growth, the expected world interest rate
and what investors will regard as an acceptable debt
ratio. These are all matters of economic (and political)
judgement rather than statistical information.
intervention by the intergovernmental IMF or for
fiscal remedies. Second, insofar as developing coun-
tries are credit rationed in global capital markets
(that is, their demand for funds exceeds supply at
the going rate) then it is decisions by lenders which
determine the level of flows; and insofar as these
lenders employ liquidity as a means of reducing
uncertainty, reactions to news inevitably causes
volatility Third, the problem for lenders is largely
one of risk management - assessing the risk inher-
ent in exchange rates and the covariance between
different elements of an emerging market portfolio
- while that for international authorities is ensuring
an orderly market. These inconsistencies are of
course inherent in national financial markets too,
and have led to strict domestic bank supervision
systems. In consequence, a logical alternative to the
IFIs would seem to be global prudential regulation
of banks engaged in cross-border operations. To
this topic we now turn.
3 Extending the Global Bank
Regulation System to Emerging
Markets
Bank failure outside the GlO
High profile failures of a number of financial insti-
tutions among the leading industrialised countries7
have highlighted the need for effective international
supervisory standards. In addition, there is a grow-
ing recognition of the risk posed to the interna-
tional financial system by the poor supervision of
financial institutions in emerging markets. The
globalisation of financial markets and the resulting
linkages between national financial systems has
increased the scope for problems in emerging mar-
ket banking systems to spill over into the interna-
tional financial system with unpredictable, but
potentially very serious, results. Moreover, the costs
of rectifying problems resulting from a banking cri-
sis can act as a significant obstacle to the economic
progress of developing economies. Pervasive lapses
Most notably Barings Bank.
The direct and indirect costs of the 1982 banking
crisis in Chile may have amounted to 30 per cent of
GDP while the total costs of the crisis in Venezuela in
1995 has been estimated at around 20 per cent of GDP
Fatal weaknesses in the Mexican banking system arising
from hasty privatisation and financial deregulation were
also exposed by the 1995 economic collapse.
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in sound banking practice in developing countries
have been highlighted not only by the Asian crisis
but also by banking sector fragility in Latin
America.5 Moreover, doubts remain about the
soundness of banking systems in a number of other
jurisdictions, in particular Russia and countries of
the former Soviet bloc, where the limited availabil-
ity of fiscal resources for supporting ailing banks
will compound the effects of a crisis.
The Basle Capital Accord standards are being
employed by an increasing number of industrialised
and industrialising countries outside the Gb. This
trend9 is likely to be reinforced by the publication
last year of the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision's 'Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision' (reproduced in IMF 1998a), which
establish best practice for bank regulators in all
jurisdictions. Amid increasing concern about the
systemic risks posed by ineffective banking supervi-
sion in emerging markets, the Basle Committee
itself is seeking to extend its reach beyond the GlO
countries, reflecting continuing concerns about the
quality and effectiveness of banking supervision.
The Basle standards were originally designed for the
industrial economies; extending them to emerging
markets, which have very different characteristics,
has proved problematic. Failure to adjust bank cap-
ital for non-performing loans has been a particular
problem in emerging markets owing to poorly
developed accounting systems and inadequate
information on the quality of bank assets. As the
East Asian crisis has unfolded, a number of appar-
ently well-capitalised local banks have been found
to be insolvent; their parlous financial position
having been disguised by a failure to recognise the
poor quality of their loan portfolios (BIS 1998).
Cross-border supervision
In October 1996, the Basle Committee issued a
report on 'The Supervision of Cross-Border
Banking', which had been agreed with the Offshore
Almost all emerging markets have adopted the Basle
Committee's 8 per Cent minimum ratio as the standard
for regulating their banking systems. However, they are
subject to much greater financial volatility than
developed countries. An 8 per cent risk- asset ratio may
therefore be too low to guarantee capital adequacy
Bank regulators in a number of emerging markets have
adopted a higher standard - for example, Singapore
applies a 12 per cent minimum ratio - but at present
there is no obligation for them to do so.
Group of banking supervisors, representing 19
offshore financial centres including l-long Kong,
Singapore, the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man.
The report provided a checklist of principles for
effective consolidated supervision, intended to
ensure that no internationally active banking group
escapes the oversight of a regulator capable of effec-
tively supervising its global operations. The report
also contained principles which could be used to
assess the quality of supervision in financial cen-
tres.'0 More importantly, the report represented a
formal recognition by the Basle Committee that
agreement among the leading industrialised coun-
tries alone was no longer sufficient to preserve the
integrity of the international financial system in an
increasingly integrated global economy In this
regard it is significant that the report was endorsed
by banking supervisors from 140 countries at the
latest biannual International Conference of Banking
Supervisors in Stockholm.
The Core Principles build on the process initiated
by the report on cross-border banking supervision,
developing the standards outlined in the report in
greater and more prescriptive detail." In addition,
the Principles emphasise the need for national
banking supervisors to be allowed to share infor-
mation with their counterparts in order to permit
effective supervision of banking supervision on a
global consolidated basis. Despite the emphasis on
information sharing and consolidated supervision,
it is likely that 'fault lines' between regulatory juris-
dictions, with considerable potential for both
profit-making and bank failure, will remain.
Reflecting the Basle Committee's attempts to extend
the reach of its standards to emerging markets, the
Including: the standards and procedures for
authorisation, the supervisory authority's ability to
gather information about the banks and banking groups
it authorises, and the powers available to the
supervisory authority to take action against authorised
institutions which breach their authorisation
requirements.
"The Principles reflect generally accepted best practice
in the GlO countries and include: clear definition of the
permissible activities for institutions authorised as banks
and controls on an institution's ability to use the word
'bank' in its name; powers for the licensing authority to
set criteria for authorisation and to reject applications
from institutions which do not meet the standards set;
supervisors must have powers to vet controlling
interests of banking institutions and to reject proposals
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Core Principles were drawn up in close cooperation
with a group of non-GlO supervisory authorities.'2
One particularly sensitive area for developing coun-
tries concerns the supervisory arrangements for
state-owned banks: the committee identifies a prob-
lem of 'regulatory forbearance' when a bank is state-
owned: regulators may be reluctant to close a bank,
or to take rapid corrective action, when the govern-
ment is known to stand behind it. At the same time,
the managements of state-owned institutions may
take excessive risks in the knowledge that taxpayer
funds will be made available to rectify their mis-
takes. Implicitly, the same principles should logi-
cally be applied to large domestic private banks
with a privileged relationship to governments.
The limitations of the Basle approach
In line with the earlier report on cross-border bank-
ing supervision, the Core Principles reflect a more
prescriptive approach by the Basle Committee. This
represents a recognition by the committee that its
traditional approach - which relied on the willing-
ness of non-GlO countries to adopt its standards on
a voluntary basis - is no longer adequate for a world
in which national financial systems are increasingly
integrated. What is more, a large proportion of pri-
vate short-term capital flows (that is, excluding
both official flows and direct foreign investment by
multinational corporations) now takes the form of
negotiable securities rather than bank credit as
such. The picture is further complicated by the fact
that a great part of these securities are marketed by
banks or by securities houses linked with these
banks, where the final purchaser may not be fully
aware of the fact that the risk is not being borne by
the bank at all.
to transfer significant ownership stakes to other parties;
supervisory authorities must ensure that banks maintain
adequate capital and risk management systems;
supervisors must require banks that lend to related
companies and individuals do so on an arm's length
basis to prevent abuses arising from connected lending;
and banks must have procedures in place, including
'know-your-customer-rules', to prevent them from being
used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal
elements.
"Comprising representatives from Chile, China, the
Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia and
Thailand. Eight other countries (Brazil, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland and Sïngapore) were
also associated with the group's work.
The Core Principles in turn form the basis of the
'Framework for Financial Stability' (IME 1998a) sup-
ported by the Bretton Woods institutions, although
here again the international dimension is mainly that
of borrowing banks, who then lend domestically
Increased surveillance by the IMF and the World
Bank of member countries financial systems is
intended to provide the kind of enforcement mecha-
nism currently missing from the GlU framework.
In 1996 Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, South
Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore
were invited to become members of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). Although the BIS
has no regulatory function as such, the BasIc
Committee (member central banks and other
supervisory agencies where these are separate from
the central bank) does mean the acceptance of best
practice. However, it would seem appropriate for
the BIS to take a more active position. None the
less, the political sensitivities implicit in supervisory
standards assessment have meant that the BIS has
been reluctant to undertake this role; a hesitation
doubtless reinforced by the unwillingness of the US
Treasury to relinquish the power of cross-border
intervention to a body that it does not control -
where agreement must be reached with Europe and
Japan in particular, and in future with major
powers such as China and Russia as well.
In consequence, under US leadership the IMF has
expanded its regular Article IV consultations with
member countries to examine the quality of domes-
tic banking supervision (IMF 1998b). Similarly,
IMF pressure for capital account liberalisation, and
for reform of its own constitution to enforce this for
all member countries, is intended to enhance its
capacity to control financial policies beyond the
present conditionality imposed on countries
requesting last-resort lending or Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAFs).
However, the IMF has relatively little experience in
financial surveillance and has made serious mis-
takes in its emergency policy packages in East Asia
(FitzGerald 1998). Significantly, the BIS bid suc-
cessfully in 1996 to host the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (JAIS); and
will soon bid to provide a secretariat for the
' Recent and ongoing changes in US banking legislation will undoubtedly have a major impact on this process.
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International Organisation of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO). This will give the BIS the
potential to supervise non-bank financial interme-
diaries as well as banks, but the political will to
exercise this power will depend on the US being far-
sighted enough to cede authority to a truly multi-
lateral institution. There are no signs of this
perception as yet, and while Europe is preoccupied
with the initiation of European Monetary Union on
the one hand, and Japan is embroiled in its own
financial crisis, there is insufficient momentum for
international pressure to resolve the impasse.
4 Contrary Responses: Mutual
Regulatory Recognition, Regional
Monetary Arrangements and a
Credit Insurance Scheme
Mutual regulatory recognition
A significant alternative proposal that has recently
emerged in official US circles is that foreign banks (or
security houses etc.) should be permitted to operate
in the US only if their domestic regulatory authorities
have been certified as competent. For instance,
doubts about the competence of Korean bank regu-
lators would be translated into refusal to grant (or
renew) the licences of Korean bank subsidiaries to
operate in the US. The attraction of this approach is
that it would provide a very powerful incentive for
regulatory authorities of leading emerging market
economies to act in a more rigorous and transparent
manner; and it is in fact implicit in many multilateral
trade agreements and the 'mutual recognition agree-
ments' (MRAs) upon which most bilateral treaties on
services trade are based.
However, there are two problems inherent in this
approach. On the one hand, there is a danger that
this system could be used as a form of disguised pro-
tection for US banks. These would be naturally
tempted to lobby for excessively strict controls to be
placed on foreign banks - particularly in view of the
increased competition being unleashed by the ongo-
ing liberalisation process.'3 On the other hand, such
an approach would increase the extraterritorial
power of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Federal Reserve, obliging them to
extend their supervisory powers overseas in a
dramatic way It would also expose the US monetary
authorities to claims from US investors if there were
to be a further crisis in an emerging market whose
regulatory system had been so certified. None the
less, an approach of this kind does have the advan-
tage of avoiding the diplomatic complications of con-
structing multilateral supervisory arrangements
through (say) the IMF or the BIS, and of avoiding the
anticipated opposition of an increasingly isolationist
Congress to further pooling of US economic
sovereignty to international institutions.
Regional monetary cooperation
The structure of regional rescue arrangements also
clearly needs to be reassessed. While rescue pack-
ages for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea were
assembled under IMF auspices, they have reflected
US policy objectives. The Clinton administration
has sought to protect US investors in the region
while simultaneously maximising the pressure on
East Asian countries to open up their financial ser-
vices markets to US banks and insurance compa-
nies. In doing so, it has exploited and - to some
extent - inspired the Funds attempts to make
emergency financing for countries in the region
conditional upon capital market liberalisation.
The reluctance of East Asian governments to cede
ownership of domestic financial intermediaries to
foreign investors has led to renewed interest in
regional arrangements for monetary cooperation. At
least in the short term, the US administration has
successfully sidelined proposals to create an Asian
Monetary Fund with an emergency financing facil-
ity independent of the IME Washington is anxious
to ensure that regional monetary arrangements do
not undermine the IMF's role by circumventing the
conditionality attached to the Fund's own lending.
However, the US Congress remains unenthusiastic
about enhanced international financial cooperation,
even if it is centred on the IME
The experience of financial turbulence in Latin
America has also led to a perceived need for greater
monetary coordination. Within the North America
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), there has been a
strong reluctance on the part of the US Congress to
establish formal institutional mechanisms, although
in practice the three central banks have become
' 'Up to these amounts, the countries concerned would rates; beyond these the creditors would have to
be able to access international capital markets at prime beware.' (Soros 1997.)
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engaged in closer operational coordination in the
wake of the 1995 peso crisis. In the Mercado
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), although there do
exist institutional fora for economic coordination,
this has been mainly concerned with tariff harmon-
isation and infrastructure provision rather than cap-
ital flows. None the less, as financial markets
become more integrated, there is a growing interest
in the harmonisation of financial regulatory rules -
and by extension for macroeconomic coordination
(FitzGerald and Grabbe 1997).
Among developed countries, the European Central
Bank (ECB) will become a major player in interna-
tional finance once it has settled down, even though
the European Union itself does not have a policy for
intergovernmental financial regulation, relying still
on MRAs (FitzGerald and Grabbe 1997). In the
longer run, a 'global G3' of quasi-autonomous cen-
tral banks (i.e. the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the
Bank of Japan) will presumably emerge, once Japan
is able to turn away from domestic problems
towards international ones. The current move to
include Russia, China, Brazil and India in the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) also implies a greater
capacity for regulatory coordination.
An international credit insurance
corporation?
Finally, the leading international investor George
Soros has proposed that an 'International Credit
Insurance Corporation' (ICIC) should be estab-
lished as a sister institution to the IMF (Soros
1997). The proposed institution would exist in
order to monitor and guarantee international loans,
and would evaluate the risks involved in investing
in a particular country When a country has
exceeded safe borrowing limits the ICIC would
stop giving guarantees and thus prevent excessive
inflows. The ICIC would set limits to the amounts
countries could borrow and guarantee loans up to
that limit. Borrowers would have to provide details
of all their loans, both public and private, to the
ICIC and thus to the market. The new authority
would set a strict ceiling on the amount of credit it
was prepared to insure, based on data provided by
borrowing nations.'4 lt is not clear whether it is
sovereign risk which is to be insured or whether
loans to private banks and corporations in emerging
markets would also be covered; given the nature of
recent crises, the latter would have to be included.
By guaranteeing international loans 'for a modest
fee', the ICIC could generate the resources over time
needed to cover normal risks, as does any other
insurance system. However its initial capitalisation
would consist of special drawing rights (SDRs)
issued for this purpose, which would 'render its
guarantees watertight' from the start. This issue of
SURs would potentially add to the global money
supply, but would not be inflationary because they
would only be drawn down in a major international
default situation.
In essence, therefore, the ICIC would apparently he
a combination of an export credit guarantee type
scheme and an official ratings agency, with a capi-
talisation comparable to the existing Bretton Woods
institutions. Insurance schemes such as the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
already exist, of course, but their scope is extremely
limited in the assets covered (direct investment)
and the market share so that they have been mar-
ginal to global financial crises. Similarly, export
credit guarantee schemes are largely confined to
supporting credit (not market) risk to national cap-
ital goods exporters and in any case are in secular
decline (DAC 1998). The technical'5 difficulties
with a proposal such as the ICIC seem to be of two
kinds. First, the existing private ratings agencies
and the intergovernmental agencies (i.e. the IMF)
responsible for monitoring have a poor record in
assessing national debt solvency, as the Mexican and
East Asian crisis have illustrated dramatically It is
not clear how the ICIC would be able to gather
more information than is presently available, assess
this information more effectively, or downgrade
countries without causing panics. Second, any
insurance scheme involves risk pooling, which
assumes a low covariance between clients' risk and
a mechanism to prevent adverse selection and
moral hazard. The problem with major financial
crises is that they are contagious, so that a number
of countries or a whole region are affected at once
(i.e. high risk covariance) which could leave the
ICIC dangerously exposed. Adverse selection would
arise because major borrowers (pre-crisis) already
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have access to international capital markets at
prime rates, so the ICIC would have an initial client
base of poor, insolvent countries. Moral hazard
implies that the ICIC would inevitably become
involved with complex negotiations (equivalent to
IMF conditionality) with countries requesting
access to the scheme or trying to avoid exclusion.
Thus this proposal does not seem viable. None the
less, the principle of funding of this scheme (or any
other last-resort lending programme) by the issue of
SDRs is extremely attractive, for two reasons. First,
in view of the scale of capital availability required
(presumably at least US$lOObn) the funding could
be virtually impossible to raise from the budgetary
resources of the member governments, but could be
provided in the form of a conditional right to issue
SURs immediately in a crisis situation. This would
certainly have made intervention in the Mexican
and East Asian crises more rapid and thus more
effective. Second, as major international crises
involve large-scale asset deflation, the addition of
liquidity to the world economy represented by a
major SDR issue would not be inflationary but
rather stabilising. Moreover, in the post-crisis recov-
ery these loans could be quickly paid back by cen-
tral banks or replaced by longer-term borrowing.
5 An Alternative Approach to
Capital Volatility: Investment
Rules, Taxation and Debt, and
'Missing Institutions'
International investment rules
Over the past decade developing countries have
embarked on an unprecedented unilateral liberali-
sation of their investment regimes. Stability, trans-
parency and objectivity in policymaking are also
desired - leading in many cases to the indepen-
dence of central banks and the accession to interna-
tional agreements in order to enhance the
credibility of the new economic regime.
International investment agreements are thus
intended to 'lock in' this liberalisation and thereby
enhance investor confidence in regulatory environ-
ments. International agreements - such as bilateral
investment treaties, double taxation treaties,
regional trade agreements and certain World Trade
Organisation (WTO) provisions - play a key role in
Leaving aside the likelihood of political opposition to such scheme in the US Congress.
building investor confidence by locking in policy
commitments over time (WTO 1997). In particular,
there is a close relationship between trade and
investment agreements at the bilateral, regional and
multilateral levels.
The accelerating trend towards bilateral, regional
and multilateral arrangements for investment regu-
lation (UNCTAD 1997) thus reflects a move away
from national rights to control foreign investment
and norms for corporate conduct. Such new agree-
ments are usually based on general standards of
treatment; coupled with norms on specific matters
such as expropriation, compensation and the trans-
fer of funds, and mechanisms for the international
settlement of disputes.
A Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is
currently under negotiation at the OECD between
developed countries, with the prospect of accession
for developing countries (FitzGerald et al. 1998). lt
is based on existing bilateral arrangements in gen-
eral, and on the provisions of NAFTA in particular,
and contains strong guarantees of property rights
and investor recognition. Membership of the MAI
could have strong positive effects in stabilising
short-term flows. On the one hand, it would
encourage investors to shift away from liquid assets
towards fixed investment. On the other hand, it
would reduce the uncertainty of banks as to the
sovereign risk involved in lending. However, the
MAI would not prevent appropriate measures to
ensure monetary and fiscal stability, nor would it
prevent control of short-term capital flows for bal-
ance of payments purposes; and it would provide
more security for longer-term direct investment. If
the MAI negotiations are not successfully con-
cluded, the same approach will be taken up in the
WTO in 1999, with the added advantage that
developing countries will be directly represented -
even though negotiations for the 'Millennium
Round' are likely to take a number of years.
However, these proposed investment agreements
suffer from two major shortcomings from the point
of view of reducing the volatility of capital flows to
It might be argued that a higher international tax on
global capital would reduce the rate of global
investment. However, it is not clear that this would
occur: on the one hand, modern macroeconomic theory
indicates that the effect of tax on savings is
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developing countries: the difficulty of taxing
international capital in order to provide fiscal
resources for social investment; and the working off
of the existing sovereign debt overhang which
increases uncertainty as to national solvency Unless
these problems are resolved, it is difficult to see how
capital flows to developing countries can be sta-
bilised and used to support sustainable development.
Global capital taxation
Moreover, neither the MAI nor the foreseeable WTO
arrangements on investment address international
investment taxation. Most developed countries have
entered into bilateral tax agreements among them-
selves, but unfortunately not with many developing
countries. Only when a multilateral tax agreement
(possibly based on the model treaty proposed by the
OECD) is implemented, would the legal framework
of international investment be complete. Such an
agreement would not only improve the fiscal revenue
position of developing countries and reduce the
attractiveness of tax incentives to foreign investors,
but would also strengthen the effort to combat
money laundering and financial fraud - again,
stabilising financial flows.
From the point of view of individual countries,
corporate profits are difficult to tax for two reasons.
First, because capital is mobile it can be driven
abroad by high tax rates or deterred from investing
in the first place. This leads to downward fiscal
competition between developing countries and a
lower average tax rate. Second, by arranging their
international transactions appropriately, companies
can accrue profits in the lowest tax jurisdictions -
which are often 'tax havens' - and thus further
reduce the tax burden on capital. In both cases
there is a clear loss in global welfare to the extent
that the tax revenue would have been used for
social infrastructure investment or effective poverty
relief.
Effective multilateral taxation of corporate profits
(or perhaps of dividends if it is desired to promote
the reinvestment of profits within firms) has
become a topic of increasing concern to developed
indeterminate, due to 'ricardian equivalence'; on the
other, the 'hurdle rate' of return for investment is far
more responsive to uncertainty than tax rates, so that
there is a potentially positive trade-off between the two.
countries in recent years, with active proposals from
the OECD for a multilateral tax treaty In addition
there are current moves to establish withholding
taxes in major financial centres in order to reduce
the tax loss on the profits generated there. In order
to strengthen this process of fiscal capture, it will
become necessary to eliminate tax havens and, at
the very least, deny the benefits of international
investor protection to firms registered there.
If such a multilateral tax treaty were to include
developing countries it would confer a number of
advantages. First, it would prevent wasteful tax com-
petition between developing countries in order to
attract foreign investors. Second, as all tax paid in
developing countries is deductable against tax liabil-
ity in (developed) home countries, increased effec-
tiveness in tax collection by developing countries
would be a net transfer between the treasuries of
home and host country - far more effective than the
present system of development assistance. Third, this
would provide a stable source of long-term funding
for the public investment in education, health and
infrastructure that developing countries require.
Such an approach would have several advantages
over proposals for a so-called Tobin tax' on short-
term financial transactions.17 A turnover tax would
have little effect on speculative flows, because at any
feasible rate it would imply a penalty of marginal
importance compared to the prospective losses
from maintaining asset holdings in a currency
under attack. In addition it would be very difficult
to collect in view of the complexity, speed and sub-
stitutability of cross-border currency transactions -
leaving aside the problem of offshore transactions.
In contrast, multilateral corporate taxation can be
based on the statutory requirement to present
accounts in some jurisdiction in order to satisfy
shareholders. The other apparent attraction of the
Tobin tax is to provide resources for international
development assistance in general and for the UN
in particular. However, aside from the fact that there
are easier forms of raising international taxation'8
" The case for such a tax is set out in Haq et al.
(1996). The reasons why it would not in fact reduce
volatility are set out in Arestis and Sawyer (1998).
' Such as a tax on international air travel, which could
be easily collected through the airlines themselves as a
condition for international certification.
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the major barrier is clearly political: the
unwillingness of national legislatures to devote
more funds to aid, or a fortiori to the United
Nations. In contrast, a multilateral corporate tax
agreement already has considerable support among
developed countries; it only requires the coordina-
tion of existing bilateral tax treaties and would not
need a new instrument. It would also deliver
resources to developing country governments
rather than to an international body and not require
- in principle - a new international bureaucracy to
administer it.
The alternative is for national tax systems to be
gradually forced back on the taxation of the
immobile factor of production: labour.
International sovereign debt
One of the key reasons for the volatility of capital
flows is doubt about the solvency of particular devel-
oping countries (FitzGerald, forthcoming). It is evi-
dent that the failure of traditional structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) to revive private
investment, both foreign and domestic, on a sustain-
able basis is closely connected to persistent sovereign
debt overhang. Similarly the failure of recent IMF
interventions in East Asia and Mexico are related to
the failure to recognise and correct private debt prob-
lems. In the commercial world, of course, insolvent
companies are placed under new management and
the unserviceable debt is written off by the creditors.
There is, however, no equivalent in international sov-
ereign debt matters (Eichengreen and Portes 1995).
In fact, the process of financial intervention in
developing countries by the Bretton Woods institu-
tions has led to the transfer of sovereign debt from
commercial creditors to the IFIs themselves. Once
so refinanced, it has become almost impossible to
write off. The current HIPC initiative (DAC 1998) is
both insufficient in scale and too lengthy in process
to make a substantive contribution to the reduction
of investor uncertainty The main reason given for
not cancelling this debt is one of 'moral hazard'.'°
" The concept of moral hazard originates in accident
insurance, where car owners, once insured, may be
careless of damage to their vehicle unless there is a
minimum claim or no-claims bonus. Whether this
notion can be rigorously applied to major
macroeconomic crises where the outcome (i.e. a bail-
out) is uncertain seems very doubtful - it is not
applicable to life insurance after all.
The other justification - that cancellation would
reduce the IFIs credit ratings and thus ability to
mobijise further development resources - is wholly
implausible because the ratings depend not on the
quality of lending but on underwriting provided by
the member governments. In other words, 1H bor-
rowing on international capital markets is secured
against fiscal receipts in developed rather than
developing countries.
The concept of moral hazard in this context refers
to the belief that if developing country sovereign
debt is cancelled, then their governments, freed
from the external constraint, will return to policies
inimicable to the promotion of private investment.
However, the existence of a large international pub-
lic-debt overhang in a considerable number of the
poorer developing countries also represents a major
constraint on further foreign investment on any sig-
nificant scale - due to the uncertainty caused by the
prospect of severe stabilisation measures in order to
meet debt service, or the sovereign risk inherent in
debt default. This debt overhang is thus a major dis-
incentive to private foreign investors, due to the
uncertainty it causes. The accession of a country to
an international investment arrangement and a
multilateral tax agreement, if combined with a
write-off of old debt, could guarantee future private
debt and thus constitute a form of conditionality
more conducive to private sector development than
the present systems operated by the IMF and other
international financial institutions.
Missing institutions
Any long term view of the development of interna-
tional investment regulation as a means of under-
pinning an equitable flow of capital towards
developing countries must logically confront these
four large gaps in the institutional arrangements,
which the experience of constructing orderly finan-
cial markets in developed countries suggests might
be necessary to contain the negative effects of global
financial instability on developing countries.
However, the problem is not just how the existing
arrangements might be improved. Rather the logical
question is what a desirable structure would look
like. The obvious approach to an answer is to ask
what institutions have proved necessary in devel-
oped market economies. These are:
s The core central banking functions of providing
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liquidity to the market, including last-resort
lending under distress conditions in order to
support otherwise sound banks and prevent
contagion; this is the putative function of the
IMF, although it has insufficient funds at present
and is only empowered to lend to governments
(or their central banks) and cannot deal directly
with global or local banks.
The collective provision of prudential regulation
of financial intermediaries, in order to prevent
not only fraud but also imprudent behaviour
with wider consequences, and to protect vulner-
able consumers of financial products; to some
extent this service is provided by the Basle sys-
tem, but it only covers key banks and leaves the
greater part of global financial intermediaries
still unregulated.
The recognition of a small number of leading
financial institutions ('market makers') who in
principle stand ready to buy and sell assets at the
current price - creating 'depth' and thus stability
in the market - and can be called upon to take
over the operations' insolvent financial interme-
diaries when necessary; these do not exist in the
global market, and although as international
banking and securities management becomes
more concentrated they could emerge, there is
no indication of how they might be coordinated.
The existence of a sound and transparent legal
system that secures contracts and provides for
efficient dispute settlement between contracting
parties and between financial intermediaries and
the regulators; this does not exist at the interna-
tional level - indeed international investors have
no status other than in municipal jurisdictions
and only have recourse to essentially political
mechanisms to solve investment disputes.
6 Conclusion
In sum, the emergence of a global capital market in
general and the East Asian crisis in particular have
called into question the adequacy of existing
international arrangements for financial supervision
and monetary cooperation (Stiglitz 1998). We have
examined a number of issues which illustrate the
social inefficiency of global capital markets and the
need for strong regulation to prevent them from
having strongly negative effects on developing
countries. This is not an argument against global
financial integration - which in any case appears to
be an unstoppable trend - but rather a case for the
construction of an appropriate international frame-
work which an orderly market requires. The official
view of the developed country governments is that
if the liberalisation of trade and investment contin-
ues then investment rates in developing countries
will rise, growth become sustainable and poverty be
gradually reduced.2° However, suppose that all this
architecture were to be constructed and an orderly
market in capital were established, the fundamental
asymmetry represented by the immobility of
labour° in a world with free movement of capital
would still remain.
In a world where capital is perfectly mobile, rates of
return will tend to equalise worldwide. Insofar as
the wage rate itself (i.e. primary income) for labour
of similar quality will tend to equalise through the
free trade process, national incomes would seem to
reflect the stock of skilledlunskilled labour and the
natural resource endowment.22 The building up of
such a stock is the prime objective of development
policy, although of course the competition between
exporting countries may drive down the world
price (wage) as the process unfolds worldwide.
However, this view of the world underestimates the
role of social overhead capital (infrastructure, col-
lective skills, institutions etc.) in determining
national income.23 Once we allow for this accumu-
lated stock (much of which is financed out of pub-
lic - or at least social - expenditure) then
international income differentials become much
more explicable (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
This is the perspective set Out by the OECD
countries (DAC 1998; OECD 1998).
z The reasons, of course, are largely political. None the
less, it is striking how few (if any) libertarian advocates
of an unregulated global economy are willing to
mention (let alone propose) the free movement of
labour. Incidentally, it is not clear that there would in
fact be an unmanageable (say more than 10 per cent)
mass movement from South to North, if immigration
controls were lifted.
See Wood (1994) for this argument in terms of an
elegant model of skilled and unskilled labour in a neo-
ricardian trade framework.
Alternatively, we might consider that (a) skilled
labour has considerable externalities and thus there are
scale economies from which individual members benefit
beyond their own marginal product, and (b) that skilled
labour requires a specific 'social infrastructure' (i.e.
education) to support it; in which case we reach a
formulation similar to that given here.
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This in turn helps to explain why foreign
investment does not in fact go to the poorest coun-
tries where the wage rates are lower - unless they
have particular resource endowments such as oil.
The implication is that the main asset which all
citizens of rich countries possess, in addition to
their individual skills or financial wealth, is the 'div-
idend' from joint ownership of their countly's social
overhead capital - an equity which they deny to
other members of the global economy24 This equity
is 'inherited' in the sense that it has been built up by
previous generations and is essentially funded by
taxation. To the extent that taxation is progressive
and the dividend is received by all citizens (nearly)
equally, the net effect is strongly redistributive - but
only within rich countries.25 There is no reason,
therefore, to believe from modern growth theory
that the unequal distribution of income between
poor and rich countries would improve from
market forces alone.
Ultimately, the issue is one of the ways in which
economic interests are best represented internation-
ally At present this is done intergovernmentally,
with substantial lobbying from labour (and NGO)
groups on the one hand, and larger multinational
firms and domestic business groups on the other.
Individual companies and social groups are not
recognised under international law despite their
growing importance (Brownlie 1990). This makes
the construction of a legally binding set of interna-
tional rules to underpin the global economy very
Supposing a unitary elasticity between per capita
income growth and relative poverty, then to reach the
DAC target of halving the proportion (not the number)
of developing-country people in poverty by 2020 would
require a doubling of per capita incomes over 20 years -
4 per cent per annum. This is far beyond the track
record of poor countries and not far off that of East Asia
(before the crisis). In contrast, since the poor receive
only 1 per cent of world income, a transfer of 1 per cent
of the income of industrial countries (i.e. 0.5 per cent of
world GDP) would double their average incomes
immediately But there is clearly no support for social
transfers on thïs scale, let alone the building up of social
overhead capital on the scale required.
' For a formal model of this notion of 'the asset value
of citizenship' and a preliminary approximation of its
financial valuation, see FitzGerald and Cuesta
(forthcoming).
difficult. None the less, the existence of such a
framework is essential if the interests of weak states
and vulnerable social groups are to be protected
(Schreiber 1997). Meanwhile, the discretionary
powers of the Bretton Woods institutions within an
unstable and unregulated global capital market
effectively prevent the exercise of either the
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